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“The cause of America is in great measure the cause of all mankind. Many 
circumstances hath, and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and 
through which the principles of all Lovers of Mankind are affected, and in the 
Event of which, their Affections are interested” (Thomas Paine, Common 
Sense). 
 
 
Introduction: making sense of Donald Trump 
 
Before one can make sense of Trumponomics one must first make sense of Donald Trump. 
Yet, how to make sense of Donald Trump?
1
 Trump is a brand. He is not a career politician. 
He is not an economist, though he holds a degree in economics earned in the 1960s. In the 
following paper I set out some well-worn points that help to provide context for Trump in 
office. These are worth synthesizing because they provide background to the shape and 
scope of Trumponomics. Despite commentary to the contrary, from a political economy 
perspective Trump and Trumponomics likely represent business as usual, albeit in angrier 
intensified and contradictory form. This in turn affects whether Trumponomics will constitute a 
structural transformation in the American economy.  
  
 
The capital-mobilising deal maker 
 
As a brand, Trump is also a particular kind of contemporary businessman. He positions 
himself as a maker of “deals” rather than a maker of things, though his wealth is rooted in 
construction and property. He is an owner of portfolio assets, who uses these to leverage new 
ventures where he is able to conjure personal gain from situations where material benefits to 
the many may be lacking. His skill set is one of concentration and extraction of returns, and 
the externalisation of costs and losses. Based on that skill set profits can artfully appear and 
equally disappear (with tax consequences) in ways that have little to do with the simplistic 
concepts of theory of the firm. The solution to any problem is an additional incorporation, a  
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1
 For biography of Trump and his family see, for example, the documentaries Radice (2017); Kirk 
(2017), and the texts D’Antonio (2017); Blair (2015); O’Brien (2016); Kranish and Fisher (2017).  
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transfer of assets, a lawsuit that deters others, a no fault out-of-court settlement that protects 
oneself, a debt restructure or perhaps a timely Chapter 11 bankruptcy declaration. Being 
proficient along these lines can make one a billionaire, particularly if one starts with a core of 
inherited wealth for collateral and has access to a network.
2
  
 
Ultimately, the returns are achieved by surrounding oneself with people able to understand 
and exploit rules and seize an opportunity.
3
 The ex post justification for this is that no one 
prevented it and “wouldn’t you do it too?”. This is important, because Donald Trump is the first 
US President to have no experience of political or military office. But he does have 
experience. His experience is of how to shape and exploit law and convention to achieve 
goals available only to a narrow interest group. Knowing how to do this does not mean he 
either knows how to prevent others or is in fact intent on preventing others from doing what he 
has made a career of. To prevent others would be to deny his own status as entrepreneur 
and so deny the US the value of such entrepreneurship. Moreover, his business skill set does 
not simply translate, mirror or reverse. It is not a simple case of poacher turned gamekeeper. 
For example, being “smart” enough to employ lawyers who can spot a loophole does not 
enable one to construct law without loopholes (if it did then the general problem would have 
been solved long ago).
4
 In any case, concentration and extraction of returns is quite a 
different frame of reference than the construction of an overall economy. Developing Trump’s 
skill set created a social subject, some might say anti-social subject. Political economy, 
meanwhile, is concerned with how we choose to live. But Trump already has a default 
position. He is by socialisation a particular personification of powerful special interests (capital 
mobilizing dealmakers). His own sense of uniqueness and superiority should not obscure this 
nor should it obscure the underlying logic it rests on, which is what is good for this interest 
group is good for the US economy. This is a deep ambiguity in Trump’s appeal once one 
moves beyond the showmanship.    
 
A US president is the focal-point-as-leader of a system of law. That is, a democratic system of 
checks and balances and the very point of that system is to constrain powerful special 
interests; those who exploit, those who behave badly. This includes through impeachment, 
the president.
5
 To function effectively, rather than to be functionally dysfunctional and so also 
be disintegrating or degenerating, the system requires a president to at least act as though 
constraint of special interests mattered. Style matters here as much as substance because 
long-term legitimacy and authority requires convention to have positive meaning. The 
increasing recognition over the last two decades that the system was not functioning 
effectively partially explains the appeal of Trump, just as it helped to explain the appeal of 
Obama. In particular, it was a neat piece of misdirection by the Trump team to construct a 
campaign that apportioned to one part of a complex the blame for the parlous state of 
American politics. That is, a Washington-centred political elite. This enabled Trump to appear 
                                                          
2
 Trump’s narrative is that he began with a loan from his father. It has also been pointed out Trump 
could have been as wealthy simply through passive investment. This is arguable and would depend on 
exactly what Trump is worth, which is difficult to ascertain.  
3
 Beginning notoriously with Roy Cohn. 
4
 One can close loopholes and create law that closes down opportunities existent under former law, but 
it is the interest in and attitude to exploitation that remains, unless relevant kinds of organization or 
practice are prohibited.
 
Trump has shown no interest in eradicating the category of “entrepreneur” of 
which he is a member. 
 
5
 This has already become a source of debate concerning the President’s financial affairs and other 
matters. Article 1, section 9, clause 8 of the constitution only prohibits emolument from a foreign state 
without permission of Congress. It has been convention to place assets in a blind trust in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest and Trump has resisted this. Some of his advisors and appointees also carry 
potential business conflicts of interest.  
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as a solution of kinds. “Drain the swamp” has disguised the very obvious fact that Trump only 
has his own socialisation to fall back on in making decisions and that of those who can 
capture his attention. Many of these are also powerful social subjects with narrow interests – 
articulating hyper-versions of current pathologies. For example, in addition to the Breitbart 
connection, Trump has increasingly drawn on fellows from The Heritage Foundation (Kopan, 
2016). The Foundation has published extensive documents setting out their preferred agenda 
for the new administration (e.g. Winfree, 2016).
6
   
 
To some degree commentary that emphasises Trump is not “really” a Republican misses the 
point. He is not a Washington nurtured political animal schooled in Republican tradition of 
public discourse; but the underlying message that he “knows how things work”, has some 
credence precisely because he is an inside “outsider”, both by long-term relations of 
patronage (he has a history as a campaign contributor) and by broader socialisation. He may 
have no experience of political office but he has experience with politicians based on the 
needs of his skill set. What he knows is how things can be broken and who one can hire to 
get things done in a broken system. This is a pathological form of knowing how things work 
that indicates also a systemic pathology. Insight and practice (such that they are) along these 
lines does not translate into ready solutions. It cannot solve partisan antagonism in a system 
that requires bi-partisanship nor does it lend itself to any clear idea of what good politics or a 
healthy economy is. That is unless one simply assumes that current politics is an impediment 
to a vibrant effective economy and all that is needed is for politics to get out of the way. 
Political economy is a reminder that politics never just gets out of the way. It is a construct. In 
any case, there is also a basic tension here since Trump has also espoused interventionist 
policies. Still, the neo-conservative personnel who surround Trump only serve to highlight that 
his election will ultimately involve intra-elite and intra-class conflict rather than their 
supersession.
7
  
 
In terms of the economy, long term experience that includes creative use of accounting that 
tests the law (without necessarily breaking it) and a litigious tendency in order to concentrate 
and protect wealth does not prepare one to ask basic important questions, such as: what is a 
sustainable business, how does one distribute wealth fairly, what is the basis of a provisioning 
economy? As such, and to reiterate, there is no reason to assume that President Trump has 
an actual interest in preventing what he has profited from or any idea how this can be done, 
quite the reverse, these will form part of how he views a functioning economy. Prevention-as-
transformation requires a fundamental systemic critique (rather than inchoate channelling of 
many discontents), and a capacity to transcend rather than affirm narrow interests and their 
socialising (anti-socialising) effects. Moreover, an interest in prevention would require him to 
embody the role of President in terms of its formal idealisation. That is, a sense of civic duty, 
                                                          
6
 Trump’s economic advisers include Stephen Moore, Larry Kudlow and Sam Clovis. Moore is a fellow 
of the Heritage Foundation, and Moore and Kudlow are both adherents of Laffer curve economics. 
Clovis is a tea party activist. https://ballotpedia.org/Sam_Clovis Carl Icahn has also emerged as a 
possible economic advisor (billionaire investor) and Peter Navarro is Trump’s appointment as head of a 
national trade council (Navarro is a critic of China’s economic and military development). George 
Monbiot makes the point that many right wing think tanks and ostensibly grassroots campaigning groups 
are essentially heavily funded corporate lobbying vehicles. A range of staff working for Trump derive 
from such organizations, including ones funded by the Koch brothers. One should note though that it is 
a feature of Trump’s political career so far that he deviates from core Republican tenets including some 
advocated by the Heritage Foundation, and there is no necessary unity within his cabinet; for example, 
ex-general Mattis, is more sceptical of Russia and has taken a more pro-NATO position than Trump 
(Mattis too has appeared at Heritage Foundation events). 
7
 There is also the more controversial issue of the “Alt-Right” and immigration policy has already started 
to intensify concerns regarding this.  
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the greater good, the welfare of the many (all too easily expressed as the West Wing fallacy). 
It would require him to have a clear and profound commitment to taking responsibility and 
acting “responsibly”. Yet both of these are ideologically informed and involve reflexive ethical 
conduct and neither is clearly associated with Trump as a social subject so far. A Trumpian 
butterfly seems an unlikely metamorphosis. Bullying the badly behaved may get some things 
done but it is also bad behaviour that ultimately undermines the system through which 
anything is achieved.  
 
 
Trump as populist 
 
Though it is questionable that Trump can or will transcend his socialisation his entire 
campaign hinged on positioning himself as though he does transcend it. He is a child of 
privilege and a publicity seeking television celebrity so this has been a glaring contradiction 
that has hidden in plain sight. Trump has been positioned as a person able to not only speak 
for but also empathise with and hence understand the “ordinary Joe”. He is by common 
reference a populist.
8
 By definition a populist appeals to the many. However, the context that 
makes populism significant as a political force is that the many who are appealed to can be 
swayed, galvanised or co-opted because of their contrastive experience of the world around 
them, and because they currently are not or feel that they are not represented and 
recognized. Their concerns as they see them are not given due weight.
9
 Trump did not invent 
income stagnation, deindustrialisation, job insecurity, debt vulnerability, or extreme income 
inequality. What Trump has done is offer some a future they want to believe in. In a 
democratic system a populist many need not be the majority, they need only be a significant 
number able to affect outcomes.
10
  
 
A populist requires a strategy to appeal to the many. Strategy manufactures a link between 
the past and the future. It warps and repackages nostalgia in the now. Populism is typically 
associated with the reduction of complex matters to simple causes and consequences for the 
specific purpose of garnering support. The reduction need not be coherent or consistent it 
need only be effective. It may well be effective because it lacks actual content and because it 
resists or refuses to respond to calls to be substantive, or to justify itself in terms of evidence 
and realisable projects. It may, therefore, be effective in its incoherency and inconsistency 
rather than merely despite it. Incoherency becomes by a trick of the psyche the grounds for 
willing suspension of disbelief. It enables optimism and hope. The believer may, therefore, 
respond by a reciprocating resistance to scrutiny of the terms of the reduction. This too helps 
to make sense of Donald Trump. His socialisation hides in plain sight because his manner 
and his track record are not secret. However, in plain sight these become something to either 
set aside (we need a change so why not him?) or laud because he ‘tells it like it is’ (albeit in a 
quasi-stream of consciousness form of garbled speech).    
                                                          
8
 For two recent explorations of the concept and proliferation of populism see Judis (2016) and Müller 
(2016) 
9
 There are two different issues here. A system may be problematic in general, and it may also have 
distributional effects, which are particularly harsh for some. See Morgan, 2017. Populism is focused 
around parallel issues that involve but are not restricted to distributional effects for some (where moral 
panic and other manipulations also apply).   
10
  Trump lost the popular vote by 2.9 million but won the electoral college vote (confirmed January 6
th
 
2017) by 304 to 227 for Clinton. However, even as a populist ‘”movement” of protest there is something 
underwhelming about the actual shift in voting. If one considers the proportions that allowed states to be 
captured by Trump then the total shift was not only small, it was far less than the average swing away 
from the incumbent party candidate after a two-term presidency. Since 1952, this has been about 5%. In 
Trump’s case it was closer to 2%. However, 26 of the 30 lowest income states voted Trump.   
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There is currently a great deal of reference to a “post-truth” political environment. However, it 
would be a hysterical response to hysteria to reduce public discourse to simply “post-truth”. 
The desire to know, to reason, to be truth-seeking have not disappeared.
11
 At the same time, 
as Philip Roth once wrote, we live in the real and not in the true. Acting as though truth-
seeking did not matter, as though truth-claims were no more than posturing rather than 
necessary standards for public discourse, is a recognized and significant aspect of reality. It is 
an anti-Habermasian tendency that has sociological consequences and these extend to 
Trump. “Telling it like it is” does not require consistency in a post-truth political environment. It 
can be bombastic and blustering. It only requires a collusive process between participants: 
the Trump team and a populist-sensitive subset of the electorate.  
 
In a post-truth environment of information silos, confirmation bias, fake news, and positive 
feedback loops of affirmation, ficts can counter facts, belief can override truth, and fantasy 
can be more attractive than realism. Against this background, all that is then required for a 
political movement to take hold is relentless messaging, momentum and an opportunity for 
capture of existing political mechanisms.
12
 Incoherency can be a campaigning strength and 
communicative capture can exploit weakness. These can shape the nature of optimism and 
hope. Uncertainty and insecurity can be worked upon to create angry and fearful hope in an 
electorate to which the populist is the solution. Optimism becomes punitive. This punitive 
optimism speaks to a more general problem of social justice but does so without ever 
considering the broader grounds through which social justice is founded, which is a 
deliberative, inclusive, and fundamentally representative and participatory system. Just as 
Trump occupies ground that obscures political economy (in deeply political ways), he offers a 
fundamentalist-as-righteous “movement”. The world is represented as Manichean, a place of 
extremes (the good and the evil, the terrible and the great) in a way that can actively resist 
reason and shout down evidence to the contrary. Such contemporary populism, of course, 
has a longer lineage. It speaks to long recognized problems: the demagogue of fifth century 
Athens, Weber’s secularised charismatic authority and so forth. Trump’s potential seems 
rather different than the ‘specifically modern form of despotism’ Charles Taylor called 
attention to nearly thirty years ago; a technocratic “mild and paternalistic” democratic 
authoritarianism licensed by a neglectful inauthentic individualism.
13
 So, if we are to make 
sense of Trump he is, as a political archetype, a populist, but a contemporary populist as a 
product of the times.
14
          
 
However, Trump’s populism has first and foremost been about getting elected. Despite 
multiple reports of offence caused to a whole array of persons based on denigrating or 
stereotyping difference (disability, religion, nationality, race, sexuality, gender) he also 
attempted to be all things to all people, albeit on his own disciplinary terms of punitive 
optimism. This extended all the way to his appeal to African and Latino Americans: I am your 
best hope even if you hate me. The tension here immediately started to manifest once he 
                                                          
11
 For example, the website of the Factcheck project at University of Pennsylvania scrutinises claims 
made in US politics and provided a host of material on both Trump and Clinton http://www.factcheck.org  
See also the EU’s East StratCom Task Force, which exposes Russian disinformation campaigns.    
12
 And, of course, in the American system, money. 
13
 See Taylor, 2003. 
14
 In terms of antecedents Andrew Jackson is sometimes mentioned as the first to run a populist anti-
establishment presidential campaign in the US. Manipulative media distortion is of course also not new. 
Jefferson and Hamilton employed different newspapers to traduce the policies and supporters of the 
other. Herbert Hoover was not a populist but he did campaign as a competent man of business. He of 
course then made the catastrophic mistakes of endorsing the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and trying to 
balance the budget in the wake of 1929.   
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became President-elect. Hillary Clinton was now a worthy opponent he had no inclination to 
see prosecuted, and President Obama was a figure with some wisdom to impart based on his 
experience as a politician. From a purely instrumental or functionalist point of view the shift 
needs to be more than rhetoric. The terms of political activity are different once elected. Once 
elected, one can no longer be a strategic, non-substantive populist. One may be an events-
led popularity-seeking president, always responding to headlines and seeking to maximise 
approval; but this is different.  
 
 
Transitional Trump 
 
Trump’s simple mantras and limited expression of policy prior to election provide the grounds 
for his presidency. A president can be more or less bi-partisan and more or less consensus 
seeking. A populist agenda may help to shape policy, but policy must still be made. At this 
point reality starts to bite. The President is not the only source of policy. There is a separation 
of powers and demarcation of powers. A president has recourse to security directives (these 
have been variously titled since Truman), memoranda and executive order. The scope of 
these is limited. Executive orders instruct branches of government to act and are used to 
bypass Congressional approval. However, they are (notionally) vetted by the Department of 
Justice and at the extreme they can be overturned by Congress. If the President exercises his 
veto the Supreme Court can declare an order unconstitutional. Orders and memoranda can 
still lead to challenges in the courts. A president cannot invoke and impose without 
consequences. To be effective a president needs to work with the House of Representatives 
and Senate. One cannot govern by memoranda and order and the US remains a bicameral 
system where federal law typically requires majorities; both the House and Senate matter. In 
any case, once office is taken what has been posed, proposed, promised, mooted or 
suggested cannot remain ambiguous, inconsistent or uncosted as an appeal to a minority-
many. It cannot remain profoundly contradictory in also offering something-as-everything to all 
the electorate (most of whom wanted something else, principally not Donald Trump). Policy 
must be actually constructed and it must then flow through a system of checks and balances.  
 
Of course, there is nothing new about policy specification as a general issue because there is 
always a transition from manifesto to governing. Still, there is something qualitatively different 
about Trump as a political event of significance. Trump’s election was shocking to liberal 
sensibilities and was a curiously foreseeable surprise (the very subject for which the term 
dread was coined). It also involved an unsettling convergence. Unusually for a candidate, 
during the campaign Trump was never pinned down and pressed to respond on detailed 
policy. Trump was elected by a minority-many with expectations of major change and no clear 
sense of how this will be achieved based on a populist post-truth environment that 
encouraged and worked with incoherency and inconsistency. Trump is also a social subject 
with a particular skill set to draw on from within a narrow socialisation and set of experiences. 
He is constituted from within a sub-set of elites who in turn constitute a further tiny minority of 
powerful social subjects. None of these subjects have a confluence of real economic interests 
(in the sense of greater income equality and job security) with the populist component of the 
electorate that gave them victory. And Trump’s confrontational campaigning style led to highly 
personal exchanges with many prominent Republicans in Congress, including those who 
stood in his way as presidential candidates or refused to endorse him as candidate.  
 
Insult and humiliation are not easily forgotten. A Trump presidency thus seems poorly situated 
to serve as a solution to a dysfunctionally functional system. Furthermore, Trump’s inaugural 
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address seemed to set sharp limits to how he sees concession. It was a speech directed at 
those who elected him rather than to the electorate, and it continued his oppositional tone 
with a “Washington elite” (both parties), whose cooperation he requires.
15
 It was the speech of 
a man used to people bending to his will, with the implication they will be broken if they do 
not. Yet a president is not a CEO. He does not employ Congress, and if the people employ 
Congress, a majority of the people did not vote for him and feel strongly he does not speak for 
them. In 2017 Republicans have a majority of 241 to 194 in the House, but just 52 to 46 (with 
two independents) in the Senate.
16
 It is not a foregone conclusion that Trump can carry either 
the House or Senate simply because they are Republican.    
 
At the same time, the term “Trumpquake” is glib in so far as it seems likely that much of what 
Trump does will involve combinations of old patterns and policies. A Trump presidency seems 
set to be an angrier version of business as usual, at least in the sense of continued inequality 
and job insecurity, despite the headline foci of Trumponomics. He is not conditioned to 
transcend his own socialisation and he is an opportunity for capture for others within elites.  
 
 
Personality and the political 
 
One should not neglect the possible significance of Trump’s personality. A self-aggrandizing 
iconoclast is his own contradiction, if not enigma. Many accounts of Trump have now been 
produced and among his less attractive traits these have positioned him as a hyper-
competitive, short-attention span, impulsive, erratic, self-serving narcissistic egotist.
17
 Some 
hope that there is (must be) more to him than this. His more ardent supporters say he is 
misunderstood and misrepresented. However, these personality traits may matter and this 
has at least two significant dynamics.   
 
First, we previously suggested that Trump’s background as a maker of “deals” does not 
translate to matters of the economy writ-large, since the skill set involved concentration and 
extraction of returns, and the externalisation of costs and losses. However, one might argue 
that Trump is more suited to the foreign policy focus of the role of president: perhaps 
international trade and international politics and security require an oppositional dealmaker; 
perhaps such a person is able to put “America first” and so “make America Great again”.
18
 
This line of reasoning assumes that the international is a zero-sum set of situations where 
strength-in-conflict allows capture of larger proportions of existing benefits. Such reasoning 
lacks a sense that current benefits are co-constructed and that future benefits can be greater 
                                                          
15
 It is odd to think that were Trump’s worldview and bearing different he might be lauded as principled 
yet naïve. 
16
 However, Democrats will be defending 23 Senate seats in 2018 and 10 of those are in states won by 
Trump.  
17
 Mudslinging and role playing seem to have become intrinsic parts of Trump’s public life so it is difficult 
to say with certainty how much of what is conveyed and inferred represents a real personality. This in 
itself may be problematic and one can only go on how he appears. See the various biographies from 
footnote 1 and perhaps watch a few episodes of The Apprentice.  
18
 Trump’s use of “America first” is justified by his defenders as reclaiming the phrase. However, it 
remains troubling to many that its historical referent is isolationism (see Rothman, 2016). There is also 
always a danger with analogical reasoning since it assumes sufficient similarity for analogy to lend 
credence to argument. Sometimes it achieves the opposite. Consider, for example, the powerful hold 
the basic equation between a household and the state has in terms of attitudes to debt. However, a 
state is not like a household for the purposes of debt, because its finances are differently constructed. 
The analogy has hampered fiscal policy and given credence to austerity. It may be the case that 
Trump’s appeal trades on the analogy that a country can be run like a business and so to make a 
country wealthy and secure put a businessman (woman) in charge.  
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based on trust and cooperation. If there are currently problems with these then the long-term 
solution is to build them up not destroy them. A spreadsheet approach to international issues 
can tell one little about how this is achieved and there is a basic tension between different 
public projections of Trump; between competent businessman as a maker of deals and the 
“alpha male” who dominates situations. In terms of the latter, the capacity to do genuine harm 
to relations is also augmented when one factors in the personality traits attributed to Trump. 
The consequences here can be extreme and immediate. Impulsiveness is a dangerous  
X-factor in foreign policy.   
 
Second, it may well be that after a brief flurry of intense activity in the first days of office, 
because of personality traits Trump is inclined to delegate a great deal of the day-to-day 
activity of president. He may become a highly visible figure constantly communicating but 
doing very little. He has already set a pattern of inviting CEOs to the White House for 
televised meetings. These are very obviously part of Trump’s attempt to project an image of 
activity that places him at the centre of attention. This is despite that the public nature of such 
events makes them peripheral to his own professed deal-making practices (though they may 
be part of a strategy to apply pressure). There is no reason to suggest CEOs will continue to 
accept these invitations if things start to go wrong for Trump (and this had already started to 
happen over immigration policy at the time of writing). He may retreat to squabble and move 
markets via Twitter.
19
 As an increasingly remote figure his chief concern may be to take credit 
for any perceived successes of his presidency whilst passing blame for failure to others. 
Again, he is an opportunity for capture by others within elites. This is already reflected by 
some of his confirmed and potential advisors and staff:
20
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 As of January 2017, Trump’s @realDonaldTrump Twitter feed has more than 19 million followers and 
had sent more than 34,000 Tweets; the White House Twitter accounts @potus and @WhiteHouse had a 
combined 13 million at the end of the Obama administration. Trump has criticised Toyota, Amazon, 
Lockheed Martin, General Motors and many others, in some cases having immediate material effects on 
share prices.          
20
 The skull and cross bones refers to persons withdrawn, not confirmed or who have resigned since the 
time of writing. This raises a further important issue. There is no necessary unanimity of purpose 
surrounding Trump, and competition for his attention can encourage “court politics”. Others may be 
equally vulnerable as power and influence shift. Note also, not all the 23 cabinet posts are represented 
here and not all had been confirmed at the time of writing. Hundreds of others still await confirmation for 
other posts. The CIA director is also omitted.  
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So, there are many factors to consider when making sense of Trump. However, at this stage 
making sense of what a Trump presidency may become is not easy. This is not just because 
there is a limit to what can be set out in a short paper. It remains truistic that politics is 
typically overtaken by events. Moreover, economists as economists struggle at a basic level 
to provide adequate accounts of economic reality and to extend these into the future. It is also 
relatively easy in the first few days of office for a president to give the appearance that a great 
deal is being achieved. However, activity is not achievement. Memoranda and some 
executive orders do no more than set something in motion. Motion may come to nothing or 
become something different. Some presidential interventions signal withdrawals, but not all 
such withdrawals can leave a vacuum. Trump’s first week in power is instructive here. The 
flurry of orders addressed many of his core campaign pledges: the wall, environmental 
caution affecting economic activity, immigration and extreme vetting etc. The results may be 
shocking and in some cases immediately damaging or harmful. But it is not yet certain that 
any or all will survive scrutiny by Congress or challenge in the courts. A great deal of what 
Trump does will also depend on the day-to-day activity of Congress and of the executive 
agencies. A great deal hinges on how the American people respond to their president. And a 
great deal hinges on what other governments do.    
 
All the above provides context for Trumponomics. It is also worth recalling that the US 
economy is not monolithic and it is not a command economy. It decomposes into regions and 
sectors and little of it is directly controlled by federal fiat. Trump may be able to shape 
institutions and apply pressure, but this is not straightforward.      
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Trumponomics: scope and strategy  
 
Trump’s inaugural address reaffirmed an economic nationalist agenda: 
 
“From this moment on, it’s going to be America First. Every decision on trade, 
on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American 
workers and American families. We must protect our borders from the 
ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and 
destroying our jobs. We will follow two simple rules: buy American and hire 
American” (Trump, 2017). 
 
During campaigning the Trump team made reference to a range of proposals bearing on the 
economy, some of which are now the subject of executive order and only some of which now 
appear on the White House site, under the headings “Bringing back jobs and economic 
growth”, “Trade deals working for all Americans”, and “An America First energy plan”. These 
are worth listing, since they indicate the range of stated intent, though the list will quickly 
become out-of-date:
21
  
 
1. Generate annual economic growth of 4%;  
2. Eliminate/reduce/renegotiate the national debt and balance the federal budget; 
3. Create 25 million new jobs over 10 years; 
4. Award $137 billion in tax credits to business over 10 years to encourage $1 trillion in 
infrastructure investment (with growth assumed to generate revenues to recoup the cost 
of the credit); link to buy American 
5. Reduce tax rates and simplify the tax code for workers (brackets at 12%, 25% and 33%) 
and for businesses (reducing corporation tax from 35% to 15%); encourage multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) to repatriate capital held offshore;  
6. Withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and renegotiate NAFTA; “crack down 
on those nations that violate trade agreements and harm American workers” or “engage 
in unfair trade practices”; apply up to a 45% tariff on Chinese imports and a 35%/20% 
tariff on Mexican imports; allow the $ to depreciate to improve exports;  
7. Encourage MNEs to repatriate production and jobs; target (for example as tariffs in 6) 
MNEs that move production abroad to deter such activity;    
8. Halt recruitment by federal departments, reduce funding to federal departments; apply a 
“moratorium on new federal regulations”; identify “job-killing regulations that should be 
repealed” (such as Dodd-Frank on finance and extending to 9 below);   
9. Reorient American environmental and energy policy; commit to “clean coal technology”; 
embrace the “shale oil and gas revolution”; “eliminate harmful and unnecessary policies 
such as the Climate Action Plan and the Waters of the US rule”; but: “accept responsible 
stewardship of the environment” and “refocus” the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) on its “essential mission of protecting our air and water”;    
10. Increase military spending to develop a comprehensive ballistic missile defence system, 
develop new cyber-warfare capabilities, expand the number of marine battalions from 24 
to 36 and active army troops from 475,000 to 540,000; negotiate buy American arms 
contracts 
                                                          
21
 The list is synthesised from initial executive orders, campaign commentary, Trump’s September 2016 
plan and then from the White House site. All quotation marks refer to “issues” sections from the White 
House site. 
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11. Build a wall along the Mexican border creating greater security and control at the border 
and generating construction employment;   
 
Not all the above have economics as their only context but all have spending consequences 
that affect the economy and so are part of the wider context of Trumponomics. The most 
appropriate way to analyse this list is to consider that a menu is not a meal, it is not even a 
recipe. The list contains some aspects that address some important issues. For example, 
those most ideologically opposed to Trump are still likely to recognize that infrastructure 
investment can be needed and economically beneficial in basic ways. In so far as modern 
capitalism in the form of neoliberal globalization is responsible for significant harms then 
opponents may also agree that the TPP and other international treaties need to be 
reconsidered. However, it is what is done and how that matters. This is not just about details, 
it is also about scope, conditioning perspectives and strategy. So, what may happen involves 
more than Trump, it involves how others respond.  
 
A useful place to start is to ask whether Trumponomics will constitute a structural 
transformation in the American economy. The broad justification and appeal of Trump has 
been that he will improve American infrastructure, expand domestic energy (fossil fuel) 
production, and set in motion a wave of investment in industry and manufacturing. This in turn 
will generate employment and wage effects leading to greater employment security, wealth 
and economic growth. Some of this depends on how corporations respond to Trump. What 
might large MNEs do? However, in general it seems unlikely that they will hinge major 
investment decisions on a president who may last one term and may, within that term, 
become a lame duck president despite majorities in Congress. Many may adopt a wait and 
see approach. In the meantime, they may accept the boon of lower corporation tax, repatriate 
some capital back to the US to show they are sensitive to the concerns stoked by Trump, and 
they may bring forward or repackage some forms of investment already planned and 
temporarily transfer some production using existing plant (pushing rather than expanding 
capacity). This may give a temporary semblance of “more American”. In some sectors this 
may be augmented for some period by consumption effects related to lowering income taxes. 
This in turn may result in better economic statistics. There is already a Trump-based asset 
bubble driving equities (a Trubble), though like all bubbles it is unstable and hinges on 
speculation regarding corporate futures. These are narratives which may come to nothing but 
allow traders to profit now.  
 
Furthermore, economic variables have multiple influences and no necessary direction of 
movement. It seems unlikely that large retailers such as Walmart can or will suddenly start to 
source American (though they may run campaigns emphasising they are doing more of this). 
It seems unlikely that manufacturers such as Apple or GM will shift all production within US 
borders. If manufacturers did “in-shore” and retailers did source American then the likely 
effect would be higher costs (bearing in mind the point of comparison is prior to any 
protectionist tariffs) passed on in higher prices. Combine this with broader tariffs on Chinese 
goods to address claims of “unfair trade practices” and Mexican goods to pay for the wall, 
then inflation could quickly start to erode any income gains provided in the short term by lower 
income taxes. This could easily be exacerbated by increasing interest rates at the Federal 
Reserve, in turn raising the costs of borrowing and likely causing the Dollar to appreciate, 
affecting terms of trade, in turn affecting corporations that are being expected to inshore.  
 
So, amongst other things, initial consumption effects expressed in economic growth could 
easily be undermined by a complex of consequences. The US is a consumption dependent 
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economy and to match this to manufacturing and industry requires more than fiat. Structural 
transformation in a disaggregated economy of powerful corporations requires the short term 
to become the long term in terms of investment commitments and policy. There is thus a 
basic coordination problem because of how the American economy has already evolved 
(many corporations will resist, delay or seek to capture or subvert what is intended – just as 
Trump himself would do; ironically Trump is a potential quasi-regulatory problem for them 
even though a core commitment is reduced regulation). Trumponomics does not seem set up 
to address this. It has transformative aspirations but the personnel at its heart are corporate 
architects and dealmakers. This is not a situation where one can just nudge self-interest in the 
way game theorists sometimes suggest, nor can one consistently bully powerful interests. If 
Twitter can move share prices then the eventual effect is persistent uncertainty, which 
undermines investment of any kind. What seems set to follow is a masked situation of 
publically dealing with dealmakers by dealmakers as though underlying logics were not 
applying and as though some of the actors within government do not also stand to gain from 
those very logics. In this context, structural transformation seems deeply problematic and the 
American worker seems peripheral at best, though some may gain in some ways.        
 
Unemployment in the US is relatively low (less than 5% but with less than a 70% participation 
rate). Any increase in employment created by initial policies seems likely to draw in non-
participants and raise wage rates. This may be beneficial in some ways but may also be short 
lived and inflationary. If interest rates rise the process will also expose the debt-servicing 
vulnerability of many workers. Moreover, general wage effects cannot be assumed to be 
automatic. Trump’s Secretary of Commerce, his original pick for Secretary of Labour, and a 
Republican dominated Congress are opposed by long-term interest and ideology to 
increasing minimum wages and reducing through law income inequality and job insecurity. 
This would be more regulation (as protections and empowerments). Trumponomics seems 
unlikely to empower unions and collective bargaining or to create institutions that place the 
onus on corporations to increase wage levels. It seems set to rely on economic growth as the 
source of distributed wealth. But the US has had a great deal of economic growth since 1980 
and very little if any improvement in wages and incomes (which is one reason why Trump’s 
populism took hold). Ultimately, Trumponomics seems likely to be dependent on trickle down 
logics and on assumptions that labour markets will simply result in higher wages. Yet if 
corporations see the consequences of Trumponomics as short lived and uncertain they have 
no vested interest in transforming wage policy and every interest in sticking to old practices of 
minimising wage costs and eroding terms and conditions against the background of dubious 
ideational justifications that emphasise shareholder value and marginal productivity. This is 
how profit has been made in many sectors for thirty years. Employment relations are not what 
they were in old industries and new jobs cannot change this alone. Those relations may have 
globalization as context but they are also localised because they are basic to corporate 
practice in many sectors. One cannot just assume that withdrawing from globalization (if this 
is even possible) will change the nature of capitalism at home. Changing capitalism means 
transforming the political economy and this requires deep institutional reform, not mere 
elimination or streamlining of regulation. This can simply intensify some current tendencies.  
 
Consider the issue of infrastructure. Tax credits as a means to incentivise private business to 
invest in infrastructure are essentially an income transfer from the state to businesses that 
then subsidises the building and hence the ownership of that asset. If it is existing public 
infrastructure that is being remodelled this is privatisation, but if not or if it is new it can be in 
any case a variant of corporate welfare. This is basically inconsistent with neo-conservative 
rhetoric though not reality. It also immediately creates a lobbying interest in influencing how 
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contracts are granted. Deal making can quickly start to look like “the swamp”. Moreover, 
private business will only invest in infrastructure from which it expects to make significant 
long-term profits. Efficiency is not an unambiguous concept. To most businesses it does not 
matter how the profits are made, so this can include lobbying for guaranteed high prices paid 
by users for years to come (tolls, taxes, strike prices etc.). Who will decide whose interests 
matter most, particularly when this has become the only way a given infrastructure project will 
get done (and there is pressure because of promises made to deliver projects)? Which 
projects won’t get done because they are not deemed profitable priorities by the private sector 
(either in general or in a particular place of need)? At the very least this framework seems 
unlikely to address the rural urban infrastructure divide or the problem of tacitly segregated 
urban decay.
22
 Despite the rhetoric, the social value of infrastructure is seemingly 
marginalized by the private sector emphasis expressed via a Trump worldview. There is no 
normative social direction to any resultant multiplier. The ideas of public goods and merit 
goods are also deformed. 
 
Infrastructure is not just about profits to business and jobs for people. It is basic to social 
design that affects how people live. It affects what people do and the consequences of what 
they do. An infrastructure program may, of course, raise wages in related construction sectors 
and generate employment demand. For example, through Trump’s insistence on the use of 
American steel. As Dean Baker has pointed out, this may directly improve incomes for 
disadvantaged groups and may also encourage into work some of working age who have 
currently fallen out of the labour force (and so are not represented in unemployment 
statistics); if projects are quickly progressed. However, this does not mean all projects are 
progressive and construction is constructive. The ultimate context here is environmental.  
 
Trump’s “America First energy plan” focuses primarily on increasing fossil fuel energy use. 
The plan’s reference to “responsible stewardship” is empty, yet meaningfully so, if one 
refuses to engage with the problem of climate change.
23
 The energy plan refers to the Climate 
Action Plan as “harmful” and “unnecessary”. Trump’s focus is on fossil fuel resources as 
business and employment opportunities rather than as ecological and moral dilemmas. The 
energy plan states “Lifting these restrictions [regulations] will greatly help American workers, 
increasing wages by more than $70 billion over the next 7 years.” Putting aside the problem 
of deriving this number, it is the phrase ‘lifting restrictions’ that is significant. This prioritises 
the economy over the environment whilst also positioning the two as antithetical – ecologically 
preferable translates to economically detrimental. In this zero-sum world why not opt for all 
out exploitation of resources? Clearly initial memoranda paving the way for the Dakota and 
Keystone pipelines illustrate this. In combination they require more than 3,300 miles of 
pipeline and supply a potential 1.3 million barrels of oil a day. 
 
The ultimate issue is not whether jobs are created but rather the baseline assumption that 
these are the kinds of jobs that should be created in a kind of economy that should be 
propagated. This is indicative of Trump’s approach to the environment and economy. Rather 
than transform the economy and its relation to the environment he has chosen to develop 
                                                          
22
 To be clear, Trumponomics is not a case of publically funded and owned Keynesian infrastructure 
expansion. It does not follow the case made that monetary policy has created exceptional 
circumstances for cheap borrowing by the state for expansionary fiscal policy. America has a swathe of 
poorly maintained roads, bridges, railway links, schools etc. as well as a recognized need to update air 
traffic control, whether these are economically viable private sector initiatives is questionable.   
23
 Pruitt, for example, is a longstanding climate change sceptic and was the subject of a New York 
Times investigation in 2014 that claims he and other attorney generals colluded with energy 
corporations to weaken federal clean-air rules. 
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along lines that are against the collective interest, including those who may find temporary 
employment building pipelines. Carbon dioxide emissions can stay in the atmosphere for 
more than a hundred years so what Trump does now creates a carbon legacy for the rest of 
the century, and this may be far more enduring than anything else he does (though 
appointments to the Supreme Court may come a close second). Of course, the impact 
assumes the pipelines are not blocked in court. Here, one should also note that the UNEP 
Emissions Gap Report in 2016 finds that the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
under the Paris Agreement are already insufficient to prevent warming of more than 2 
degrees. Many are concerned that Trump will withdraw from the Paris Agreement. If he does 
so it will be mainly for symbolic reasons, since his administration can simply fail to set or 
pursue stringent NDCs (the system is voluntary and bottom up).            
 
Of course, the US is also home to major investment in new technologies as part of a “fourth 
industrial revolution”. There is little sense of this in Trumponomics. For example, 
Trumponomics involves no actual strategy to address or realistically assess the impact of the 
digital economy, robotics etc. on employment. However, putting this aside there is also major 
investment in alternative energy, transport, farming, and living in the US. These are now 
embedded. What is clear is that they are not at the core of Trumponomics (meetings with 
Musk and others not withstanding). Trumponomics is a lost opportunity regarding how the 
future could be shaped. One can also consider trade policy along these lines. Globalization 
has been deeply problematic. It is worth recalling that it is not just American workers in some 
sectors and places that have experienced adverse consequences. Deindustrialization in some 
parts of America has matching problems of industrialisation in others. This includes Mexico 
and China. Branco Milanovic’s recent work on the “elephant curve” does not ameliorate this. 
The core issue concerns what kind of economy benefits all rather than pursuing a logic where 
different countries engage in a tussle for industry as is.  
 
Trumponomics treats trade like some Wild West frontierland dispute. Everyone is staking a 
claim in a world that seems in one sense lawless and in another rule bound. However, it is 
only lawless if different actors choose to act as though it were. Protectionism fosters trade 
wars and these are deeply harmful. Others will follow the logic of action you apply. This is 
antithetical to subsequent bilateral trade treaty “negotiation”.
24
 There is also a deep 
contradiction in using protectionist threats to attempt to compel corporations to inshore in 
order to then create an exporting economy. To assume that the US can act with impunity 
because others will not dare to reciprocate requires fallacious reasoning. Once one puts aside 
the empty neoclassical calculative agent one must recognize that just like Trump, other 
policymakers in other countries have rationales based on constituencies and expectations. If 
the US can be “irrational” in the strict economic sense, so can they (we simply call this 
reality). Moreover, the US is not all-powerful and its capacity to inflict damage is highly 
variable. For example, exports are now only around 20% of China’s GDP (in so far as one 
can rely on the figures), of which around 18% is to the US. So, less than 5% of China’s GDP 
is at direct risk from any actions in the US (though clearly there is more complexity to this).
25
 
China can also bring the current rules to bear and Trumponomics on trade seems likely to 
                                                          
24
 There are also checks and balances here, the president must give Congress 90 days’ notice before 
opening negotiations, 30 days’ notice of trading objectives and 90 days’ notice before any agreement is 
signed. This enables scrutiny. 
25
 For example, one issue is whether conflict might trigger vulnerable instabilities in the Chinese 
economy. According to the Bank of England, China’s debt currently stands at around 260% of national 
income and a significant portion of this is provided by unregulated lenders implying lax lending practices 
and chains of debt linked to non-performing loans.  
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violate World Trade Organization standards. The underlying issue is the way current rules 
and practices are to the collective detriment of citizens of the world. This implies that 
globalization could be different not that trade is evil. Trumponomics does nothing to contest 
the current problems of globalization it simply takes them as a given and then seeks isolated 
advantage for one country in an interdependent system. This is perverse, since the 
interdependencies will still hold and form the basis of likely damage to all parties.  
 
Again, Trumponomics seems a lost opportunity, just as it fails to consider institutional and 
organization transformations within the US that could address some of the deep causes of 
problems, it fails to consider how globalization could be addressed collectively to transform 
the system that produce adverse consequences everywhere. Problems of races to the 
bottom, dignity at work, fair wages, “global wealth chains”, corporate responsibility, tax 
avoidance and evasion, environmental harms, and social justice are as applicable 
internationally as they are domestically.
26
 Trumponomics, occupies the territory of 
transformative change without actual change. Despite the rhetoric it is fight trade not fair 
trade. One basic reason for this is ideological. Though Trump is not a traditional Republican 
he shares the basic premise that regulation means more state and more state is interference 
in the natural order of things. As such, removing regulation will encourage more business 
activity and this in turn will be economically beneficial. His very first meeting with CEO’s 
emphasised this position. This assumes business can be relied upon to act responsibly and 
that there is a convergence between business interests and society’s interests – so most 
regulation is simply unnecessary and disempowering, rather than a source of positive 
empowerment, protections and support that can also mediate interests creating checks and 
balances. Whatever else Trump may say, this is basically market fundamentalist 
neoliberalism. However, it is neoliberalism in conflict, since Trumponomics seems set to be 
disruptive to free movement of capital and labour. Moreover, deregulation is ideology rather 
than reality since corporations also value regulation (and seek to shape and exploit it). Yet the 
commitment is important since it also speaks directly to the policy tendencies that resulted in 
the problems that Trump was then able to position himself as a solution to. The idea that 
repealing Dodd-Frank or Sarbanes-Oxley will somehow reinvigorate the US economy is 
deeply flawed.
27
 The basic commitments of Trumponomics, such that they are, are refuted by 
the very history that lies behind his presidency and the tenability of the commitment is, 
arguably, refuted by his own track record in business.   
 
However, the ultimate contradiction still to be played out is between Trumponomics and the 
most basic of Republican tenets. The aggregate of policies seem set to reduce tax revenues 
and increase federal spending, despite any freezes on hiring for federal agencies and the 
likelihood of reduction in scale of many agencies. It seems unlikely that a Republican 
dominated Congress will support budgets that seem set to increase federal debt. The less 
popular Trump becomes, the easier it will be for Congress to oppose him. The form this takes 
will simply mean less of Trumponomics will concern direct fiscal expansion and so more will 
involve transfer of powers and assets to corporations. This too involves a contradiction, since 
the potential for some corporations (and financial actors) to benefit from Trumponomics does 
not mean he will be viewed any differently as a problem of political risk for corporations. So, 
                                                          
26
 See Seabrooke and Wigan (2017); Morgan (2015, 2016) 
27
 As David Dayen has noted potential conflicts in the finance sector are broader. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were put in conservatorship in 2008. Various groups have lobbied to have the two 
recapitalized and these include hedge funds who have invested significant sums in ostensibly worthless 
assets and who stand to gain from reprivatisation.   
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one can bring the analysis back to where we began from with the problem of strategy and 
action that will shape how Trumponomics develops.             
  
 
Conclusion   
 
The problem of low or no growth – of secular stagnation – is widespread. Trumponomics 
seems set to do no more than create conflict within the system that is experiencing that 
stagnation. As such, Trumponomics seems unlikely to deliver 4% economic growth, or at 
least there is nothing transformative about Trumponomics that could justify this claim. This 
lack of transformation is one way to think about how Trumponomics might be defined, a 
constituted presence and absence:  
 
1. Trumponomics relies on aggressive, interest pursuing and conflictual action within the 
current political economy, domestic and global. It seems set to involve hyper-versions of 
current pathologies and intensifications (albeit in tension) of current tendencies. 
2. Trumponomics seeks to remove impediments without due consideration to reconstruction 
or transformation of the institutional and organizational basis of the political economy. It 
involves interest led regulatory removal (combined with streamlined and targeted 
inducements) that seeks to free capital to work and trades on the assumption this will 
benefit workers and society in the US, whilst potentially obstructing free movement of 
capital and labour beyond the US.  
 
It should be emphasised that the above is no more than a framework for context derived, to 
mix metaphors, from a menu and no more substantive than that menu. Trumponomics will 
also have reality. It will be contestable and the consequences remain to be seen. However, if 
we employ popular terms of the day Trumponomics may involve a melange of autocracy, 
plutocracy and kleptocracy in ways that will not emancipate the “precariat”.    
 
For his critics, the best-case scenario restricts Trump to a one-term aberration, one whose 
failures and contradictions serve as a death knell to neoliberalism.
28
 However, there is no 
necessary reason why a Trump backlash will result in a more reasoned politics and 
progressive approach to economics. He may be the first in a line of populists, each creating a 
gravitational pull on the centre ground of politics and preventing any reasonable stability. 
Also, though his actions so far do not invite confidence, Trump’s tenure as president may not 
manifest as worse case scenarios. Checks and balances still apply and fear-filled rhetoric 
apart, he inherits an economy that is more stable than the one Obama began with in 2009. 
What he eventually does remains open. However, it seems unlikely history will judge Trump 
kindly. Even if Trump manages to deliver some of what he promises the scholastic fallacy will 
still be invoked by analysts (the danger of seeing subtlety and sophistication where none 
exists).  
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